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The 13th ESRC Annual Lecture



SOCIAL EUROPE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

By Sir Tony Atkinson FBA

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Annual Lecture

SOCIAL EUROPE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Social Europe gets much less publicity in Britain than economic Europe. Everyone has heard about the Euro and monetary union. The development of the Common Internal Market is well known. Most people are aware of their increased freedom to work in different European countries. But the social dimension of the European Union receives little attention.

It is true that, in the early days of the Europe of Six, social policy was largely a means towards achieving other objectives, aiming to remove barriers to labour mobility and to ensure that differences in the cost of social protection did not prevent competition in the supply of goods. Since then, however, social issues have come to figure more prominently on the European agenda. In the year the United Kingdom joined, the European Commission produced a Social Action Programme that recognised that the Communities had an independent role to play in the formation of social policy and agreed the implementation, in co-operation with Member States, of specific measures to combat poverty. The *Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community in 1973* described this programme as 'setting out in a purposeful way the initial practical steps on the road towards the ultimate goal of European Social Union' (European Commission, 1974, page 9). Critics may question the desirability of such a goal, but there can be no doubt of the longstanding ambition of the EU to have a social as well as an economic dimension.

Twenty five years later, at the end of the century, we seemed to have travelled only a short distance along this road, but the situation changed with the Lisbon Summit of March 2000, where Heads of State and Government decided that the Union should adopt the strategic goals for the next decade of becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy [with] greater social cohesion'. The goal of economic dynamism received most attention in the UK media, but the juxtaposition in this statement of competitive/dynamic economy and greater social cohesion marked a revival of the conception of Europe as a social as well as an economic community.



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This Lecture describes recent developments in social Europe and seeks to identify the contribution of social science to these developments. Two key steps have been the establishment of national action plans on social inclusion, as part of the process of open co-ordination, and the agreement by the Member States of the EU on a set of European social indicators to be used in assessing progress towards social goals. These institutional innovations will be considered in the first section of the Lecture. At a more personal level, I will talk about the experience of preparing a scientific report on social indicators for the Belgian 2001 Presidency. This report was part of the process of reaching EU-wide agreement, and leads naturally to the subject of the second part of the Lecture, which is the relation between social science and social policy. This is, I hope an appropriate theme for the ESRC Lecture, in the light of the objectives of the Council, although – given the topic – I will be referring to research funded by European as well as national agencies. I shall be referring specifically to the role of theory and conceptual analysis, to the availability and quality of data, and to policy modelling. Finally, from my examination of the relation between social Europe and social science, I shall draw a number of conclusions for social science research.

SOCIAL EUROPE

After Lisbon: National Action Plans and Open Method of Co-ordination

At this point, you may quite rightly be thinking that under subsidiarity, a principle enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, social policy is the prerogative of each individual Member State. Social measures in the UK are determined by Gordon Brown and Andrew Smith, not by Angelina Diamantopoulou, the European Commissioner for Social Affairs. The present UK Government attaches a great deal of weight to fighting social exclusion, but this is its own choice, not the result of EU directives.

It is precisely for this reason that the European social agenda is being pursued in a different way from the economic agenda. There is no counterpart of the European Central Bank or a common interest policy. What was agreed, at the Nice European Council in December 2000, was to advance social policy on the basis of an open method of co-ordination, an approach recognising that, under the principle of subsidiarity, social policy remains the responsibility of Member States (see Begg et al, 2001). The open method of co-ordination involves 'using a management by objectives

approach, whereby EU institutions draw up guidelines and monitor their implementation by Member States' (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes, 2000, page 83). The European Commission is invited to identify good practice and to promote its common acceptance. The same process has been in operation in the field of employment, and, just as in the case of employment, it was decided that each Member State should implement a two-year national action plan. The first national action plans on social inclusion were submitted by the 15 Member States in June 2001, and that of the UK Government is available on the website of the Commission and of the Department for Work and Pensions.

The UK Government is quite rightly taking this process seriously. Here I should emphasise that the principle of subsidiarity is often misunderstood. In the public finance literature on decentralization, there has been analysis of the allocation of functions to different levels of government, particularly between federal (EU in the present context) and local (governments of the Member States). Some have argued that functions should be allocated to local governments where there are marked differences in preferences between local areas. As James Meade put it in his paper on *The Building of a New Europe* (1991), this allows freedom for national diversity, as opposed to continental uniformity. Subsidiarity would then leave each Member State free to determine the extent of social protection on the basis of the expressed preferences of its electorate. Some countries would choose a highly redistributive policy, with associated higher taxes, and other countries would provide lower levels of social security. However, this is not what is envisaged in Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union, which states that 'the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'. It refers explicitly to the objectives of the proposed action. In other words, it does not leave national government free to determine the objectives of redistributive policy. The freedom of Member States lies in the choice of the means by which common objectives are to be achieved; Member States individually are not free to determine those objectives. To quote Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, "national welfare states remain the primary institutions of European social policy, but they do so in the context of an increasingly constraining multi-tiered polity" (2000, page 268).

EUROPEAN SOCIAL INDICATORS

It is here that social indicators enter the stage. Social indicators are an embodiment of the commonly agreed objectives. The process of open co-ordination involves fixing guidelines for the EU, establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators to be applied in each Member State, and periodic monitoring. At the Nice Council, the European Commission was requested to monitor the implementation of the social agenda and to prepare an annual scoreboard of progress. In order to achieve this, the EU Social Protection Committee established a Sub-Group on Social Indicators, chaired by David Stanton of the UK Department for Work and Pensions. (The Social Protection Committee consists of senior representatives of Member States who are charged with preparing the business for the Council of Ministers of Social Affairs.)

The results of the work of the Sub-Group on Social Indicators (European Commission, 2001a) were accepted by the Employment and Social Affairs Council in December 2001, and now form the basis for European Union policymaking. Member States have succeeded in defining an agreed set of European social indicators. The primary indicators (see Table 1) encompass financial poverty, income inequality, regional variation in employment rates, long-term unemployment, joblessness, low educational qualifications, low life expectancy and poor health. In each case there are breakdowns, showing for example poverty among men and women, or breakdowns by age. A range of indicators was reported in the *Joint Report on Social Inclusion* (European Commission, 2002), so that we now have an idea what the European scoreboard looks like. This is indeed intriguing. Do some countries always come at the top? Or is it like the World Cup where the favourites unexpectedly come unstuck?

Figure A shows the proportion of the population living in financial poverty, defined as having a disposable income adjusted for household size that is below 60 per cent of the median in their Member State. This is a relative measure of financial poverty, relative to the incomes of the country in which they live (in measuring financial poverty we have not yet moved to considering Europe as a whole). Predictably, risk of financial poverty is lowest in the Nordic countries, and highest in the countries of Southern Europe. The UK belongs in this respect to the South. Although we should remember that this has not always been the case. The UK poverty rate 20 years ago was under half its current figure, and the UK would have been considerably further to the left of a European league table at that time. Of course, Figure A largely predates the Labour Government

– the figures relate to 1997 – and one hopes that the UK poverty rate will have fallen by the time of the next national action plan.

A major plank in the UK Government's policy to combat poverty is a reduction in the number of jobless households. Figure B shows the percentage of jobless households in 12 of the 15 EU Member States in 1999. This graph illustrates two points. The first is that the ranking is rather different from that for financial poverty. It is true that Ireland is again close to the bottom, but the UK and Greece have moved into the middle. Portugal is second, whereas France and Germany are near the bottom. The second point concerns the heading. These figures are those reported to the Stockholm Summit, but what do they mean? What is the meaning of a 'jobless household'? This is an indicator where there has been intense debate about the definition – an issue to which I return.

Figure C shows the proportion of the population aged 18-24 in 2000 who are not currently in education or training and who have only a lower secondary education qualification. The rankings change once more. Again this raises serious definitional issues. The UK comes top but a lot hinges on the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) being defined as a higher secondary qualification. As Hilary Steedman (1999) has shown, this can make a sizeable difference to the UK figure, particularly when one considers the working population as a whole and not just those who have just left school.

SCIENTIFIC REPORT FOR BELGIAN PRESIDENCY

This brings me to the question of the scientific basis for social indicators. As part of its preparations for the European Presidency in 2001, the Belgian Government commissioned an international team (Bea Cantillon of the University of Antwerp, Eric Marlier then working for the Belgian Presidency, Brian Nolan of ESRI in Dublin, and myself) to prepare a report on the design of social indicators. This report was published as *Social Indicators: The EU and Social Inclusion* by Oxford University Press earlier this year.

Our aim was to provide, not a treatise on social indicators in general, but an examination of the issues surrounding the construction of indicators for use in the European policy process. The purpose of the indicators is crucial to their design, although this is often overlooked. We had for instance considerable difficulty in persuading people that for this purpose it is essential that the social performance indicators be concerned with outputs rather than inputs. This reflects the fact that, as noted earlier, the policies to achieve social inclusion are the responsibility of Member

States, under the subsidiarity principle. The objectives of policy have been agreed, but Member States are free to choose the methods by which these objectives are realised. One country may achieve low poverty rates by active labour market policy; another may place more reliance on social transfers. Spending alone is not a guide. In one Member State transfers may be provided by the State; in another Member State transfers may be private. In one country, training may be associated with apprenticeships; in another training may be part of the school system. Of course the distinction is not a rigid one, but in general we recommended that the social performance indicators, for the present purpose, should be concerned with outputs not with inputs. The aim of the EU indicators is to measure social outcomes, not the means by which they are achieved.

The second aspect of social indicator construction considered here concerns the monitoring of changes as opposed to levels of indicators. This is a point that we did not develop in our report, and with hindsight I can now see that it should have been given greater prominence. We concentrated on the best way to construct indicators of the current levels of performance, but this may not be the best instrument to measure whether performance is improving. In certain circumstances, measuring changes may indeed be easier. For instance, the diversity of European educational systems may cast doubt on the comparability of the definition of 'higher secondary education'. The UK may appear in a favourable light by counting GCSE. But changes in the proportion with GCSE may be a reasonable guide to the direction of movement. I am not saying that this is the case, but it is a possibility worth consideration. I stress this point because changes are going to be subject to close scrutiny when the next round of national action plans is submitted. This is particularly the case when we move beyond monitoring indicators to the setting of targets. In the case of financial poverty, the European Commission proposed to the Spring European Council in Barcelona that the EU should set the target of halving the poverty rate by 2010 (2002a, page 16). Ministers are going to ask how far they are on target to reach such an objective, just as questions are being asked in the UK about the Government's success in cutting child poverty. It is the changes that are coming under the microscope. The same applies at a global level. The *Millennium Development Goals* (World Bank, 2002) have set ambitious targets – for the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality, improved health and environmental sustainability. The key question people are asking is – are we moving in the direction of reaching these goals?

CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

What then has been the contribution of social science to the process of developing the social agenda, and specifically in the field of social indicators? Here I identify three main areas.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

The first contribution is theoretical: the illumination of underlying concepts and their inter-relationships. In the present context, one of the key functions of theory is to aid the translation of ambitions, rather generally and imprecisely stated, into concrete indicators. For example, there has been a broad agreement among European governments that they wish to reduce the number of jobless households. An indicator (shown in Figure B) was presented to the Spring Summit in Stockholm in 2001. What however does this mean? Once one begins to ask how this can be translated into instructions to the person writing the SPSS or STATA programme, it becomes clear that joblessness is a complex concept. One has to define the population of people who are potentially in work. My 97 year-old mother is clearly not included, but where should the age limit be set? Is a 55 year-old retired schoolteacher 'jobless'? How should one classify people caring for young children or other dependants? Member States differ in their views about the availability for work of single parents. Indeed the concept of joblessness as a whole reveals marked differences across countries. Some countries see it as an instrumental goal: worklessness leads to financial poverty or to other forms of material deprivation. In that case, if social protection is adequate, there is no need to be concerned about joblessness. To justify the use of the joblessness indicator, it is not enough to treat it as instrumental; we have to appeal to an intrinsic concern for employment as a force for social inclusion. Seeking to apply this concept across European countries brings out the different ways in which joblessness is perceived. It is a good illustration of a notion which, to quote Bernard Williams, "has very strong evaluative implications – governs what people do – but is deeply tied up with a network both of institutions and of interpretations of human behaviour" (1971, page 156).

The theory relevant to the present context is that concerned with the relation between social objectives and social variables. In economics this branch of the subject is known as welfare economics, but this topic has strangely disappeared from the economics curriculum. Economists do not devote a great deal of time to investigating the values on which their analyses are based. The general position of economists today is well

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summarised by Robert Solow who began his Tanner Lectures by saying “a lecture ... on ‘human values’ by an economist; one might as well invite a turkey buzzard to lecture on table manners. How would the poor beast know where to start?” (1998, page 3). In contrast, a generation ago, welfare economics was an integral part of the discipline. Students were expected to study books such as Ian Little's *A Critique of Welfare Economics* (1957). Welfare economics was seen as central, since much of economics was concerned with matters of efficiency and equity, and students needed to understand the basis on which such terms were defined and employed.

The need for such conceptual analysis is well borne out by consideration of social indicators. In each case one has to ask – what is the objective underlying an indicator and how does this influence the definition to be adopted? Welfare economic analysis serves to clarify key issues, as we argued in our scientific report for the Belgian Presidency. The example I take is multi-dimensionality. Everyone seems agreed that social inclusion is a multi-dimensional concept. It is not only concerned with financial poverty. As Amartya Sen has put it, “the role of income and wealth ... has to be integrated into a broader and fuller picture of success and deprivation” (1999, page 20). But this poses the challenge as to how this integration should take place. How can the different attributes be aggregated? Here there is less agreement.

To begin with, we have to distinguish two different forms of aggregation. The first combines aggregate indicators; the second combines different elements of deprivation at the individual level, which are then summed over individuals to form an aggregate. The first is illustrated by the Human Development Index (HDI), inspired by Amartya's work, and developed by the UNDP. The simple addition of separate indices for Gross Domestic Product (GDP), life expectancy and educational attainment has been much criticised, including by Partha Dasgupta in last year's ESRC Annual Lecture, but serves to broaden the focus from looking only at national income. This corresponds to the desire for multi-dimensionality. However, we argued in our report (Atkinson et al, 2002) that this was not the right way to go for the present purposes of the EU. Here the interest lies in the differing performance of different Member States in different dimensions: that Portugal scores badly on financial poverty but much better on joblessness. The aim of the process is that Member States should seek to learn from each other. Moreover, politically, the process is unlikely to be acceptable if attention is focused

on a single rank order. (I do not discuss in this Lecture the political economy of social indicators and targets; I have explored these issues with regard to national poverty reporting in Atkinson, 1996.)

For EU social indicators, multi-dimensionality enters at the level of the individual household. Mathematically, we should reverse the order of summation. Rather than, as in the HDI, summing first across people and then across fields, we should sum across fields for an individual and then across individuals. Put differently, we are concerned that people as individuals are suffering multiple deprivation. But here two questions arise. How do we combine the different elements at the level of the individual? One can again identify two different approaches. One is to count deprivations, showing how many households are deprived on all three dimensions, how many on two dimensions and so on. A quite different approach is to trade off severity of deprivation. A household may have one too few rooms and hence be classified as over-crowded and have £1 a week less than the poverty line. Are they, with two deprivations, clearly worse off than a family with the right number of rooms but with an income as much as £50 a week below the poverty line?

Social scientists have no claim to answer these kinds of questions, but they are often able to identify that there is a question to be answered. They have a role to play in clarifying the underlying concepts and I hope that, in the case of my own discipline, the near disappearance of welfare economics from the curriculum will be rectified.

DATA

Translation of these abstract concepts into numbers requires data. Much of our scientific report was concerned with the availability of data and the possibility of implementing the different social indicators. Europe's leaders may have identified key areas of concern, but can we actually provide concrete measures, with a sufficient degree of comparability across Member States?

Ten years ago, the answer would have been pretty dusty. When Michael O'Higgins and Stephen Jenkins (1990) were asked to produce estimates of the extent of poverty in the European Communities at the end of the 1980s, they heroically came up with a number, but it was based on a variety of sources, differing across countries, in part micro-data and in part tabulations, in part expenditure rather than income, in part

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extrapolated from earlier years. Now, we have the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which is a panel survey based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviews with a representative sample of households. The first wave was conducted in 1994 in the then 12 EU Member States, since when Austria (1995) and Finland (1996) have joined the project. (See Eurostat, 1999). Experience with carrying out the panel has undoubtedly revealed a number of the problems with this kind of exercise. Such problems are especially evident in countries where official statisticians have extensive access to administrative records, and the new instrument to replace the ECHP will make use of administrative registers where available. But the ECHP provides a firm anchor for the measurement of social indicators. It has two major strengths. To begin with, the panel design is naturally well suited to the measurement of change. Secondly, of particular value is the fact that the ECHP covers a wide range of topics, including income, health, education, housing and employment. Of the 22 indicators listed separately in the report of the Indicators Sub-Group, no fewer than 14 refer to the ECHP. One can see here an immediate link with my earlier discussion of multi-dimensional deprivation. With an HDI approach, each of the dimensions can be measured in a separate survey, and the aggregate results then combined. But if we are concerned with the overlap of deprivations for an individual household, then we must measure all dimensions in the same survey – or be able to link the micro-data to another source with the relevant information.

The ECHP is an excellent example of the return to foresight. The use made of the ECHP data in today's policy discussion must exceed even the most optimistic assumptions of the designers of the panel nearly a decade ago. Moreover, the ESRC can take particular credit, since it decided to invest in the British Household Panel Study, which is now the UK element of the ECHP.

MODELLING

Turning now to the substantive outcomes of the indicators, we should note that the European Commission is charged with evaluation of the national action plans. Here again social science research has an important function. A highly active field of research in the past 25 years has been microsimulation policy modelling. This is indeed a field where Europe is one of the world leaders. For this, the ESRC can again claim some credit. Indeed it was back in the days when it had a different name (the Social Science Research Council) that the Council funded a research programme directed by

Mervyn King, now Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Nicholas Stern, now Chief Economist of the World Bank and myself. The Taxation, Incentives and Distribution of Income Research Programme was among the first to work on micro-data from the Family Expenditure Survey and to develop computer programmes to simulate policy changes. It began with a programme to calculate corporate tax changes, written by Mervyn King, and then went on to programmes to analyse personal tax and social security. The simulation programme TAXMOD, written for use on a BBC Micro, which shows its date (1983), came to be widely used to examine the effect of tax and benefit changes on a sample of UK households, and it is still going strong, in more advanced form, as POLIMOD, at the Microsimulation Unit in Cambridge, directed by Holly Sutherland.

National tax benefit models have now been developed in many countries, but for the present purpose of assessing European-wide progress, we require a microsimulation model covering all Member States. Suppose that Europe's leaders signed up to the European Commission's target of halving poverty by 2010. Is there a realistic prospect that this could be achieved? An answer to this question requires a EU-wide policy simulation model. Here too the funders of social science research have made good investments. Successive Framework Programmes of the EU have funded the EUROMOD simulation model for taxes and benefits (Immervoll, O'Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999, Sutherland 2000). EUROMOD makes use of micro-data on individual households for each of the Member States (in a number of cases these data are drawn from the European Community Household Panel). The data have been brought together in a consistent format at the European level and used to make calculations of the impact on household incomes of changes in policy parameters, such as income tax, social security contributions, indirect taxes, social security benefits, housing benefits, and other policy variables. The underlying behavioural assumptions are highly simplified, assuming no change in labour market or savings behaviour, but nonetheless the calculations are of considerable complexity, since the different variables interact. An increase in child benefit for instance may in some Member States be subject to income tax, and it may lead to a reduction in income-tested benefits, both of which interactions reduce the net gain to the household. Using this model it is possible to examine the likely quantitative impact of policies already announced, and of the measures that may be necessary to achieve the desired poverty reduction. This is the subject of ongoing research, research that will become increasingly crucial as 2010 approaches.

CONCLUSIONS

Has social science research made a difference? I have argued that social science has considerably aided the progress made in the past two years towards developing the social agenda of the EU. In the scrutiny of the underlying concepts, relating indicators to underlying objectives, social scientists have demonstrated their capacity to illuminate policy choices. In the analysis and assessment of household survey data, they have effectively implemented the indicators designed. In the construction of simulation models, they have provided the tools needed to judge progress. I have been critical in places, for example of my fellow economists for their neglect of welfare economics, but the record overall is impressive.

At the same time, there remains the question as to whether the policy developments I have described will mean anything on the ground. Have social scientists simply been bit-players in a charade? The open method of co-ordination is often dismissed as 'cheap talk'. There are no policy institutions such as the European Central Bank. There are no financial penalties as under the Stability and Growth Pact. Member States can ignore the social indicators, so perhaps the UK media have been right not to devote space to them. The social policy has moreover to be seen in conjunction with macro-economic policy. The requirements of fiscal stability mean that Member States enjoy less flexibility in their choice of social policy. The freedom of choice allowed under subsidiarity may be largely illusory if policy is dictated by budgetary considerations.

We will have to wait to see if this is true, and much depends on the European Convention and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (Vandenbroucke, 2002), but there are good reasons to suppose that Member States will take seriously the regular two yearly review of progress towards social inclusion, and their performance on the social indicators. Peer pressure from other Member States cannot be ignored. Frequent contacts at ministerial level have their effect. Domestically, the existence of social indicators can be exploited by organisations defending the socially excluded. Certainly in the UK the focus on 'delivery' means that the performance indicators will be carefully watched. Those with long memories will recall that the failure of the Wilson Government to reduce poverty, and the campaign waged by the Child Poverty Action Group, was regarded as one of the reasons that Labour lost the 1970 General Election. Moreover, the adoption of the European social indicators conveys a

clear message to those countries currently applying to join the European Union. The indicators embody the social goals that must be endorsed by the Accession Countries.


For social science research, I draw three lessons. The first goes almost without saying. I have not made it explicit, but the research on social indicators described here has drawn on a wide range of social science disciplines. Inter-disciplinarity has arisen naturally, and this is the way in which it should happen. People come together working on subjects of common interest or using data sets in common. The second lesson should also be clear: the role played by infrastructural investment. The ECHP could not have been launched specifically to answer the questions that arose when the EU became concerned about social indicators. The lead-time is simply too long. Similarly, the construction of EUROMOD has taken around five years. It was only because funding agencies took a medium-term view that these projects were supported. They took the right decisions then, and I hope that they will remember today's pay-off when contemplating today's funding requests.

The final lesson is perhaps more controversial. I believe that an important role has been played in this story by the independence of researchers. To begin with, at a personal level, I would have been unable to do the research described in this Lecture if I had not been able to take sabbatical leave in 2000/2001, generously provided by my College. The institution of sabbatical leave, often regarded with scepticism by those outside universities, is, in my view, an essential element in ensuring the vitality and independence of research in the UK. What is more, I had no advance plan to embark on this research. It only emerged in the August my leave started, so would not have featured on any research plan, if I had been required to file one in advance with my Governing Body. What happened is that I reported ex-post on how I had spent the leave. This leads me to conclude by asking whether we have gone too far in requiring applicants for funding to specify their intended research. I referred earlier to the SSRC research programme directed by Mervyn King, Nick Stern and myself. I have always thought that this was the ideal way of funding research. In our initial proposal in 1977 we were quite open as to the fact that we had little idea as to how the research would develop; ex-post I believe that by following our instincts we were led in interesting directions. Certainly a number of the major outputs, such as the tax benefit simulation models, were completely absent from the original research application. This combination of ex-ante independence and ex- post accountability seems to me essential to allow new scientific areas to develop and to allow researchers to apply their ideas to issues of current policy.


TABLE 1: Primary Indicators Agreed by European Union December 2001

1. Percentage of individuals living in households with low incomes (below 60% of the national median equivalised income);
2. persistent financial poverty;
3. depth of financial poverty;
4. ratio of income of top 20% to that of bottom 20%;
5. co-efficient of variation of regional employment rates;
6. long-term unemployment rate;
7. percentage of people living in jobless households;
8. early school leavers not in further education/training;
9. life expectancy at birth;
10. self perceived health status by income level.


A



B



C



Belgium	B	Luxembourg	L
Denmark	DK	Netherlands	NL
Germany	D	Austria	A
Greece	EL	Portugal	P
Spain	E	Finland	FIN
France	F	Sweden	S
Ireland	IRL	United Kingdom	UK
Italy	I		

SOURCES OF FIGURES:

- Figure A:
European Commission, 2002, page 185.
- Figure B:
European Commission, 2001, page 53.
- Figure C:
European Commission, 2002, page 198.

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