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Business, taxation and welfare

Grant reference: RES-060-25-0033

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Working paper details

Optimal income taxation with tax competition
This paper introduces tax competition for mobile labour into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels and analyse a symmetric subgame- perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations
English

Primary contributor

Co-author Vilen Lipatov

Additional contributors

Co-author Alfons Weichenrieder

Additional details

12 July 2013
No
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
20 March 2012
Oxford
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation working paper

Cite this outcome

Harvard

Lipatov, Vilen and Weichenrieder, Alfons (2012) Optimal income taxation with tax competition. 12 July 2013. Oxford: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.

Vancouver

Lipatov Vilen and Weichenrieder Alfons. Optimal income taxation with tax competition. 12 July 2013. Oxford: Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation; 2012.