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CEO Effects on Firm Performance in China: The Role of Incentives, Firm Governance Arrangements and CEO Human Capital

  • Start date: 01 June 2011
  • End date: 31 May 2012

This study uses descriptive and multivariate secondary analyses of firm-level data for China to achieve the following objectives:

  • establish the incidence and correlates of incentive compensation packages for chief executive officers (CEOs) in Chinese enterprises
  • explore the quality of CEOs in China according to their observable human capital, and establish whether incentive payments and stock options induce high-quality CEOs to join the firm
  • establish whether CEO compensation is associated with firm performance and, if so, how
  • examine wage dispersion within Chinese enterprises and establish whether it is associated with firm performance and with incentive compensation
  • examine the extent to which Chinese enterprises adopt structures and practices which facilitate transparency and CEO accountability, and test the proposition that those with better governance structures also perform better
  • in undertaking 1-5, establish strong bilateral and multilateral links with labour economists in China with a view to on-going collaborative empirical work using data on workers and firms.